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“A people without history is like a wind upon the buffalo 
grass.”1 Teton Sioux Saying 
 
On October 6 1968, before the fifth game of the World Series, a 
blind Puerto Rican singer sang a stylized version of the Star 
Spangled Banner. The following day The New York Times reported 
that Jose Feliciano’s “performance caused consternation and 
criticism amongst television viewers throughout the nation.”2 
NBC’s New York office immediately reported some 400 calls. Across 
the country the network’s affiliates were flooded with irate 
messages. The interpretation of our sacred national song enraged 
veterans groups, and the 23-year-old's performance, the first 
nontraditional version of an anthem to be widely heard by 
mainstream America, was retrospectively referred to as the 
Lexington and Concord of Star-Spangled Banner controversies when 
National Public Radio revisited it 38 years later.3 
 
It was estimated that, prior to Feliciano’s rendition, the 
National Anthem had already endured over 1,000 different 
                                            
1 Gary B. Nash, Charlotte Crabtree and Ross E. Dunn, History on Trial 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1997), p. 8. 
2 “Fans Protest Soul Singer’s Anthem Version,” (The New York Times), 
October 8, 1968. 
3  Tom Goldman, “Anthem Singer Tests Land of the Free,”  (National 
Public Radio) October 27, 2006. 
versions.4 Feliciano’s was remarkable not only because it was 
viewed by millions, but because it seemed oddly juxtaposed when 
framed within the penultimate American sports event. Though 
millions contemptuously thought Feliciano’s interpretation of the 
anthem defamed a national icon, within a month RCA rushed the 
live version into a record complete with the mixed crowd noises.5   
 
Feliciano’s rendition occurred only seven months after a South 
Vietnamese General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, the chief of the Saigon 
national police, executed a National Liberation Front (NLF) 
prisoner before a rolling camera in what H. Bruce Franklin called 
“one of the most shocking, influential and enduring single images 
from the Vietnam War.”6  This single act further galvanized an 
already burgeoning anti-war movement. And in many ways the 
reaction became a complimenting subtext to Feliciano’s non-
traditional approach to the National Anthem.  Both of these acts 
were performed on a national stage and were viewed differently by 
two parts of a divided nation, conflicted by the war, America’s 
role in the world and an unsettled domestic landscape.    
 
These images and others that cascaded in front of us during that 
tumultuous Vietnam period, rekindled the conflicts that an 
earlier “progressive school” of American historians always saw 
lurking beneath the surface of our history. These were conflicts 
a “consensus school” of historians in the period following World 
War II were only temporarily able to reconcile under the banner 
of an exceptional “American way of life.” In the paradoxes that 
emerged in the tumultuous, reformist period of the 60’s, American 
history, as Gary B. Nash writes, could no longer be made to be 
                                            
4 Donal Hanahan, “Soul Spangled Banner,” (The New York Times), October 
27, 1968. 
5 “Anthem, Sung by Feliciano, Is Issued by RCA Records,” (The New York 
Times), October 17, 1968. 
6 H. Bruce Franklin, Vietnam and Other American Fantasies, (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), p.14. 
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nice.7 Nor could it be easily confined. Greil Marcus suggests it 
could no longer be studied as a “little Peyton Place of the 
mind.” It had come time to “study America, the whole shebang, in 
all its imbecile complexity.”8 
 
The conflicting interpretations of the National Anthem and 
Vietnam War within the context of this tempestuous period in 
American history are forever crystallized in these two discrete 
black and white images. In her work Prosthetic Memory, Alison 
Landsberg asks whether the projection of such imagery by mass 
technology upon our collective consciousness can actually have a 
role in the construction of a more tolerant and accepting 
national ethos. In her view, mass culture has the potential to so 
commoditize a society’s memories that we have the very real 
potential to share in one another’s ethnicity, pain and values.  
Landsberg asks whether electronic culture can help shape a shared 
ethos and a more unified community by its use of imagery. Can our 
collective experience of technologically projected sights and 
sounds act as a sort of prosthesis that helps eradicate the 
differences that have traditionally marked the human condition? 
In this way can mass technology create a more “socially 
responsible” culture?9   
 
The conflicts in interpretation of the Feliciano and Nguyen 
images would seem to dictate otherwise. At the time, the imagery 
divided more than it united. And yet against the predominant 
traditions of American historiography these contemporaneous 
reactions are both explainable and predictable.  
 
                                            
7 Gary B. Nash, Charlotte Crabtree, and Ross E. Dunn, History on Trial, 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1997) p.56. 
8 Greil Marcus, The Old, Wierd America, (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1997) p. 91.  
9 Alison Landsberg, Prosthetic Memory, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2004).  
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Then and now, these images serve to remind us that left 
unexplained, the impressions of any period are chaotic, 
contradictory and confusing. Post modern U.S. historiography, it 
will be argued here, has greatly enriched and enlightened our 
understanding of specific cultural phenomenon from our collective 
past, though often in very narrowly confined temporal and spatial 
dimensions. As broadening as these studies are to our vertical 
understanding of specific periods, places and people, they now 
need to enlighten our horizontal understanding of the broader 
themes that unify our American experience.  
 
As historians we have a critical role, if not obligation, to help 
interpret the dissonant imagery that comes to us when we train 
our eyes on any period. The images of Feliciano and Nguyen still 
stare at us almost two generations later begging us to sort 
through the conflicted imagery of a past still clouded by too 
vivid memories.  We are at a juncture in U.S. historiography, it 
will be argued, where our penchant to sift meticulously through 
the rubble of the past, and micro analyze its granularity, is 
beginning to threaten our ability to form a broader integrative 
narrative and fulfill history’s role in the development of a 
widely shared national ethos.  
 
In examining the American past, our historiography has typically 
alternated between consensus and  conflict. 10   Prior to World 
War I, American historiography was largely a celebration of the 
similarities in the American tradition; or, at the very least 
history’s role was to promote a perception of a shared American 
experience, even if that meant ignoring or rationalizing the 
slave experience, the oppression of the Native American or other 
subtexts that distracted from the American “epochal.” The debate 
then largely focused on the way history could be most objectively 
discovered and told in the traditions of a post Baconian 
                                            
10 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), pp.320-360. 
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Enlightenment imperative that affirmed the past could be reduced 
to a series of immutable facts, if not truths. As Peter Novick 
incisively offers, the cozy atmosphere of those few scholars who 
defined what was appropriate made it possible to define 
objectivity because there was a shared agreement on “a history:” 
No community can be satisfied that its discourse is 
objective---or even know what it would mean to be 
objective---without substantial agreement on values, goals 
and perceptions. 11 
 
Thus the debate over the objectivity of historical endeavor which 
predominated at the time the American Historical Association was 
founded (1884), was in some ways moot due to the homogeneity in 
background of those practicing the craft. History as practiced by 
the Bancrofts, Motley’s, Parkman’s and Prescott’s at the turn of 
the century was largely a unified history because these were all 
Harvard graduates from New England backgrounds. As John Higham 
has suggested, American history was the story of “… freedom 
realized and stabilized through the achievement of national 
solidarity.”12 
 
But within a period of sixty years from the AHA’s founding 
American history underwent very different treatments by two 
contrasting historiographical traditions, one emphasizing 
conflict and tension in the American tradition, the other based 
on a consensual meta-narrative that emphasized the inherent 
ability of America to subsume conflict. The progressive 
historical school of Turner, Robinson, Beard and Becker, focused 
on the “discontinuity” of the past” and gravitated toward a neo-
Marxian view of the class conflict in U.S. history, that “give(s) 
the language of social conflict a distinctively American 
inflection.”13   
                                            
11 Novick, Noble Dream, p.61. 
12 Higham et.al., History: The Development of Historical Studies in the 
United States (Princeton, 1965), pp.158-160. 
13 John Higham, ”Changing Paradigms: The Collapse of Consensus History,” 
The Journal of American History, Volume 76, No.2 (Sp.,1989) p.462.  
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By contrast, the consensual school that emerged post World War 
II, was marked by the publication of Richard Hofstadter’s 
American Political Tradition in 1948.  The consensus school 
sought to subsume the conflicts inherent in progressive 
historiography into a broader conception of the exceptional 
American ethos. In the aftermath of post World War II, this 
approach to American history gave special emphasis to our unique 
heritage based upon a Lockean liberal consensus of property and 
individual rights.   Unlike the Progressivism of Beard or Van 
Woodward, which stressed the conflict inherent in our economic 
and societal structure, the consensus historians sought to 
project how America was spared the feudal traditions of Europe 
and thus did not possess a conflict ridden, class oriented 
society. This lack of class ridden antagonism was complimented by 
a rational democratic political order built upon Lockean notions 
of property rights and individual liberty (at least for most 
white males).14 
 
What was consistent historiographically with both these schools 
of American history was the conceit that the “big truths” of 
history were so self-evident that, by a communitarian criterion 
of the truth, to be within the consensus was ceteris paribus to 
be objective.” The triumph of the consensus school, at least so 
they thought, was in sustaining their view of “a variegated 
people held together by a unifying ideology or a common way of 
life.”15 Hofstadter proclaimed that the “rediscovery of complexity 
in American history was the greatest achievement in postwar 
historiography.”16   That the consensus school thought they could 
find unifying themes midst this complexity stands in stark 
contrast to what was soon to follow.  
 
                                            
14 Paragraph drawn from my 5 page paper (Book review of Hartz and Ward) 
15 Higham, “Changing Paradigms,” p. 464.  
16 Novick, Noble Dream,p.324. 
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For with the watershed publication of Lawrence Levine’s Black 
Culture and Black Consciousness in 1977, a new period in American 
historiography emerged.  The narrative of the “American 
consensus” was challenged and the field embarked on what 
unfortunately has come to be termed a “deconstructionist” phase. 
This is an unfortunate label because the new historiography is 
deconstructionist only in the sense that it challenges the 
artificial constructions of the consensus historical school and 
pushes against the bipolar constraints of the progressives.  More 
constructively what the post moderns have done in the last 30 
years is to reestablish and illuminate the sense of remarkable 
complexity that Hofstadter himself had found beneath the surface 
of consensus.  
 
For the post moderns no subject escaped the camera’s lens 
(Nguyen) or was beyond the singer’s interpretive range 
(Feliciano).  Levine, and soon his myriad new school disciples, 
noting that “historians are the prisoners of their impoverished 
sense of sources and historical subject matter,” 17 sought to open 
the doors on new research material and give voice to the 
narratives of those left by the curb of American historiography.  
The result was a deconstructionist, post modern explosion of 
cultural and intellectual treatments of what Nan Enstad has 
appropriately and ironically (given its association with British 
imperialistic military structure) termed “subaltern” history: 
 
In recent years, a dynamic multi racial cultural history 
has emerged from the continuing development of 
Latina/Latino, Asian American, Native American, African 
American, gender and sexual histories, from the challenges 
to the fixed nature categories, and from the notions of 
                                            
17 Nan Enstad, “On Grief and Complicity: Notes toward a Visionary 
Cultural History. Forthcoming in Cook, Glickman and O’Malley eds., The 
Cultural Turn in U.S. History: Past Present and Future (Chicago, 
2007),p.6.  
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borders and empires as they shaped the identities of 
residents and migrants.18 
 
In the post Vietnam era, we have surely expanded our 
consciousness of the breadth and depth of history in ways that 
even Levine might not have been able to grasp. It is from the 
heights rather than the depths of this new platform that we can 
now more fully address the seemingly dissonant underlying 
subtexts such as Feliciano’s rendition of the National Anthem or 
more fully comprehend the significance of Nguyen’s Vietnamese 
street assassination. Rather than foreclose the possibility of a 
new approach to American history, the post modern school actually 
unlocked the very possibility; one yet to be realized. 
  
So how is a unifying American narrative to be discerned and 
redefined from the now growing body of granular analyses and the 
exploding number of post modernist “period” pieces that address 
various cultural phenomena from prostitution to minstrelsy?  For 
example, we can marvel at the precision with which Elizabeth 
Blackman in her 1990 work Manhatten for Rent (to pick one from 
this genre’) peers into the dustiest archival data on property 
ownership, floor plans, and city directories to bring us a 
masterful analysis of “class geography” in ante bellum America. 
Certainly the fecundity of such highly focused treatments, done 
over the last thirty years have significantly enriched the 
potential to understand our past and begin to conceive how a new 
meta-narrative might emerge. The scholarship is in many cases 
stunning in its depth, taking us down deep silos to the grainiest 
of micro-revelations and in the descent, leaving traditionalist 
white man’s history in the dust.  But do these works collectively 
constitute enough of the sort of “thick description” that we need 
to begin to resurrect a coherent American ethos?   
 
                                            
18 Enstad, p. 11. 
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In his classic work The Interpretation of Cultures the 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz addresses the very tension between 
the “thick description” of the astute ethnographer, and the role 
of cultural anthropology to ascribe meaning to observation. As 
Geertz says, “it is not necessary to know everything in order to 
understand something.” Perhaps more relevant to the dilemmas that 
the historical method shares with that of the cultural 
anthropologist, is the temptation to concentrate ever so finely 
upon the minute so that any sense of the interpretive is buried 
in the descriptive. And yet, at the same time, Geertz 
persuasively argues, the generality of theory cannot obliterate 
the specific of observation. Thus Geertz would suggest that we 
need always be mindful of the ongoing tension between the 
empirical and the theoretical and that the balance in describing 
culture is ever so subtle: “What generality it contrives to 
achieve grows out of the delicacy of its distinctions, not the 
sweep of its abstractions.”19 So when Geertz in his classic work 
writes about the cock fight in Bali, this tension between the 
objective and the abstract is in full view and the delta between 
the two always credible.  He can derive a unique Indonesian 
cultural ethos from the observation of Balinese males in this 
ritual, “paradigmatic, human event,”20 because his interpretation 
seldom strays very far from the events or their description.  
 
If as historians we are to be able to explain why America would 
so deeply divide over the imagery of Feliciano and Nguyen, we 
need be mindful of the tightrope Geertz walks. We need recognize 
what happens when the historian assumes too much the role of 
novelist or public intellectual, and less the role of the 
enlightened Baconian scientist or investigative journalist; too 
much the story teller and not the fact finder? The historical 
                                            
19 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, (New York: Basic 
Books, 1973), p. 25.  
20 Geertz, p.450. 
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literature is littered with the results of those who seek to use 
selective historical facts for their own ideological purposes.  
 
In reacting to the “granularity” of post-modernism we can tip the 
scale too far and quickly fall into the genre of politicizing our 
past. For example, Civil War history has been a magnet for the 
editorialist as historian seeking refuge in overt “historicism.” 
David Blight depicts the nostalgic confusion that occurred in 
post-Civil War America as individuals on both sides of the Mason 
Dixon line let their current perspectives shape their views of 
the recent past. The Reconstruction fell woefully short of 
providing finality; indeed serving to exacerbate the underlying 
divisions between races and regions and allow selective memories 
of the war to cascade into the next century and this one as well.   
 
Most notably beyond the concrete memorialization of the victims 
of the War, this irresolution gave birth to the mythology of the 
Lost Cause, a genre of historical revisionism that became a “full 
fledged mythology across American society.” 21 The historical 
tributes to the Lost Cause came to occupy a large space between 
the cynicism of Ambrose Bierce’s depictions of the atrocity and 
emptiness of the war, and the “cause lost” realism of W.E. B. Du 
Bois’s masterwork Black Reconstruction in America.  
 
The Myth of the Lost Cause gripped the South in the wake of 
Reconstruction and emerged as a force that, as Rollin Osterweis 
argues, could allow this defeated region and “way of life” to do 
in peace what it had been unable to do in war,  “overcome the 
victor.”22 The South would indeed rise again propelled by this 
revisionist view of its noble history. So large was this 
sentimentalist approach to the past that its grip extended well 
into Northern states, and as Blight has suggested became “a tonic 
                                            
21 Blight, p. 251. 
22 Rollin G.Osterweis, The Myth of the Lost Cause (New Haven: The 
Shoestring Press, 1973), p. 5.  
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against fear of social change,”23  as a wave of industrialization, 
immigration and geographic mobility predominated at the turn of 
the century.  
 
No single feature of the Lost Cause Mythology was more powerful 
than the apotheosis of Robert E. Lee as the dignified fallen 
leader of the cause itself.  In the example of Lee the danger of 
superimposing the historical needs of the present upon the past 
becomes abundantly clear. For the Lost Cause historicists who 
sought to continue to project the Confederate cause in spite of 
their military defeat were able to enlist the imagery of the 
gentlemanly Lee as a way to reestablish its justness of their 
cause. Among the most unabashed Lee apologists was Douglas 
Southall Freeman, editor of the Richmond News Leader, who 
solidified the General’s image in a series of articles and a 
biography that “marbleized” and created a canon of Lee imagery 
that caused Freeman to become “impatient with those who sought to 
investigate more deeply.”24   
 
The “Lost Cause” approach to the past, as used here, is meant to 
refer to a fundamentally flawed historiographical approach that 
seeks to impose a theory of how the present might best be 
explained, or lived, by selectively and conveniently 
reconstructing the memories of the past. Using this method, the 
facts are redesigned to conform to a specific ideology or 
theology of the present. The school of sentimentalist, Lost Cause 
historians are significant here for the method they used rather 
than to any real contribution to our understanding of the Civil 
War or its aftermath.   The concern is that historical accounts 
that fall into this “Lost Cause” genre, those with predetermined 
narratives in search of the supporting facts, are still very much 
with us. So while this approach may give us tempting narratives 
                                            
23 Blight, p. 266. 
24 Thomas L. Connelly, The Marble Man (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University, 1977), p.152. 
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to reconcile the conflicting reactions to Nguyen and Feliciano, 
the integration and unification it allows are at the steep price 
of accuracy and empirical truth.  
 
Today, for example, the Lost Cause approach is evident both in 
the “Noble Cause” revisionism of Vietnam War history and the 
reaction this revisionism has produced as manifest in works such 
as The Spitting Image (Jerry Lembcke) and Vietnam and Other 
American Fantasies (H. Bruce Franklin).  The divide between these 
ideological interpretations of the Vietnam War is very similar to 
those so-called histories that followed in the immediate 
aftermath of the Civil War. And in the case of Vietnam, they are 
as divisive as the War was itself to the American polity. As 
Lembcke so insightfully concludes, how we remember Vietnam is 
becoming increasingly important not just for the sake of 
historical accuracy, but because it goes to the very essence of 
what historians offer in the ongoing debate over what it means 
“to be a good American:” 
 
Reclaiming our memory of the Vietnam era entails a struggle 
against powerful institutional forces that toy with our 
imaginings of the war for reasons of monetary, political, 
or professional gain. It is a struggle for our individual 
and collective identities that calls us to reappropriate 
the making of our own memories. It is a struggle of epic 
importance.25 
 
These new Vietnam interpretations, arguably too close to their 
subject period, like other Lost Cause approaches, do not 
illuminate the past. Rather as Lembcke himself suggests, they 
move us farther away from a more dispassionate view of what 
actually occurred during the Vietnam era. They leave the 
conflicting reactions to the imagery of Nguyen and Feliciano in 
tact and in fact exacerbate the underlying tensions.  
 
                                            
  
25 Jerry Lembcke, The Spitting Image, (New York: New York University 
Press, 1998), p.188. 
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Thus Vietnam, like the Civil War, provokes nostalgic revisionism, 
and is a tempting target for those who want history to be shaped 
to advance political and ideological agendas.   And like the 
Civil War, with emotions still raw thirty years since it ended, 
Vietnam is an example of how current context may be 
inappropriately used to advance historical interpretation over 
historical evidence; to put the narrative ahead of the gathering 
of fact. But it is hardly the only example of the dangers 
inherent in contextualized history. 
 
The inappropriate filter of contemporary context is central to 
the Lost Cause approach to historiography. Jane Tompkins is among 
the most adamant in the belief that in historical analyses, 
context has a too dominant influence and one that is hard to 
ameliorate. She notes historians need to be keenly vigilant of 
the way decisions and judgments (in her case those regarding what 
literary works were to be included in the forming of the 19th 
century American literary canon) are handed down to us through 
generations. For Tompkins it is essential to parse through the 
hegemony of bias that captures any period, “because looking is 
not an activity that is performed outside of political struggles 
and institutional structures, but arise from them.” 26 
 
Being able to sort through the influences a given period has on 
how its memories are projected and thus how they are subsequently 
received becomes a paramount factor in the pursuit of accuracy.  
Historical treatments of the Holocaust present real insight into 
the dangers contextualization pose for the historian.  Dismissing 
the fringe conspiracy theories that question the very historical 
reality of the Holocaust, the more vexing issue is how the 
Holocaust has been assigned an importance, or as Peter Novick 
                                            
26 Jane Tompkins, Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American 
Fiction 1790-1860 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p.23. 
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would put it, has moved from the margins of American 
consciousness to the center.  
 
To draw from the approach Tompkins’s has applied to “great” 
literature, it is clear that the Holocaust’s plot line, like that 
of any classic novel, has not changed. What have changed are the 
circumstances (or context)that suddenly elevate the event to 
occupying a space in our collective memory.  And Novick 
attributes this sudden ascendancy of the event not to any new 
discovery of its horrid dimensions, but rather to a complicated 
set of factors that formed a new context in which its is viewed, 
among them a post Vietnam “victimization syndrome,” the fear 
among Jewish leaders that their Jewishness was being subsumed by 
a more diverse American culture, and the media’s projection of 
the Holocaust through news documentaries and mini-series. To 
paraphrase Novick, it is not that the Holocaust changed, but 
rather we did.  
 
The challenges of elevating above context and cause are 
formidable for historians seeking to reconcile the conflicted 
imagery of any period. But as the post modern era reaches a sort 
of stasis, American historiography is at a tipping point. We 
remain vexed by the challenge of how to better explain the images 
of Feliciano and Nguyen and more importantly why they evoked such 
dissonant reactions. The challenge is to clearly place their 
images in the larger sweep of American history divorced from 
context or cause. So what methodology should we adapt that brings 
rigor to our analysis and overcomes the burden of context and 
cause?  
 
Marilyn Young argues that “the essential American meta-narrative 
has traditionally been based on a belief in the fulfillment, over 
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time, of the enduring principles of the Founding Fathers.”27 That 
simple statement implies that the fulfillment itself is indeed a 
continuing struggle and that we are defined more in the journey 
toward their attainment.  This existential view is akin to that 
put forward by one of the leading consensus historians, Louis 
Hartz, who saw America always differentiating and distancing 
itself from Europe by its adherence to principles of Lockean 
idealism.  Hartz and others in the consensus school were not 
enamored with using conflict as a way to structure the narrative 
of American history, and in fact insightfully noted that the 
Progressives had their own Hegelian model to overcome the 
conflicts they were so ready to portray: 
Actually there was amid all the smoke and flame of 
Progressive historical scholarship a continuous and almost 
complacent note of reassurance. A new Jefferson would arise 
as he had always arisen before. The “reactionaries” (i.e., 
Hamilton) would be laid low again. 28 
 
In short, even the Progressive school saw arising out of the 
constant conflicts in our history a new synthesis which, as the 
consensus school was obliged to point out, resulted from that 
unifying subtext that seems to underlie the exceptional American 
narrative.   
 
But for us today, having come full blown into the post-modern 
period, placing the increasingly complicated and conflicted new 
revelations of historical fact into the neat and clean basket of 
the Lockean- Republican democratic ideal is becoming ever more 
challenging.  The legacies of slave masters’ tortuous practices, 
the no-nothing’s harassment of immigrants, or the industry 
captain’s heavy handed treatment of labor organizers, are but a 
few among many episodes difficult to reconcile with the liberal 
traditions of the Founders. And the continuing examination of 
                                            
27 Marilyn B. Young, “Dangerous History: Vietnam and the ‘Good War’” in 
History Wars (New York: Henry Holt and Company), p.200.  
28 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt 
Brace and Company, 1955), p. 32. 
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resistance to equal rights for African Americans, Native 
Americans, and women, whose own narratives have been so recently 
enriched by the post-modernists, also poses a challenge for 
contemporary historians seeking a new paradigm that will more 
fully explain and unify our historical experience. Recent 
accounts of these struggles have become the “inconvenient truths” 
which we need to reconcile. These are the lurking shadows in the 
Feliciano and Nguyen images that are begging us to weave a new 
meta-narrative that will help us deal with the irony of the past 
and overcome the tendency to view them as backwaters rather than 
integral to the mainstream of our history.        
 
Joyce Appleby and her colleagues have described “the urgency each 
generation feels to possess the past in terms meaningful to it.”29 
But in the wake of post modernism how should that meaning be 
reassembled? Post modernism has offered analysis rather than 
synthesis, and in the process caused a puerile counter-reaction 
in the recent political assaults on the historical profession 
itself as lacking any standards or beliefs.  Indeed post 
modernism has irritated a cadre of traditionalists who view post-
modernism as failing to enrich our understanding of forgotten 
American narratives, and instead disassembling long held American 
mythologies, including the bedrock notion of progress itself. So 
the traditionalists characterize post modernism as: 
 
…insist(ing) that the experiences of genocide, world wars, 
depressions, pollution, and famine have cast doubt on the 
inevitability of progress, enlightenment and reason, even 
while they implicitly deny human access to certain 
knowledge of these same disasters.30  
 
Against the backdrop of this traditionalist critique it is 
legitimate to ask how historians should now proceed to synthesize 
                                            
29 Appleby, p. 265. 
30 Appleby, p. 202. 
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a broader narrative; to build upon the richness of post modern 
studies rather than simply critique its effects.    
 
Simply continuing to critique post-modernism not only 
unnecessarily politicizes the study of history but misses the 
fundamental issue. For the valued contribution of post modern 
relativism is a fecundity of new racial, ethnic and gender 
narratives, as well as an explosion in cultural histories that 
upend long held beliefs about traditional power structures in 
America. Collectively these have a feeling of standing apart from 
one another; disconnected from what we conceive to be part of a 
more traditional American narrative.  Standing on their own they 
are often profoundly insightful, but toward what end?  In the 
post-modernist, multicultural genre, the challenge is how to 
avoid a multiculturalism that simply panders to the desires of 
every sub-group in our society to know its own past, and instead 
use weave a broader narrative about of how each of us carries a 
“complex fusion of cultural identities and attitudes”31 that has 
enriched our historical experience and indeed does argue for its 
exceptionality. Before too quickly discarding the protests of 
those historical traditionalists who see in the post modernists a 
simple obsession to elevate separate histories and a dangerous 
trend toward historical relativism that tears at the national 
fiber, we need ask ourselves the relevant question: How can we 
put together a more encompassing narrative that addresses these 
concerns?    
 
History, as Nash reminds us, is almost always a means of 
furthering a sense of national self, a way to “promote national 
cohesion and civic pride.32  Historians, though clearly limited by 
their own historical contexts, nonetheless possess an enormous 
responsibility to forming our concepts of community and nation. 
If a new conceptualization of the underlying sentiment and 
                                            
31 Nash, p.77. 
32 Nash, p. 15 
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morality that informs our beliefs, practices, and customs (i.e., 
a national ethos) is to emerge, then historians share a large 
part of the burden of helping shape our understanding of how a 
newly defined ethos is consistent with our variegated past. 
 
Thirty nine years after the images of Feliciano and Nguyen, we 
can be far more comfortable with a narrative that can explain the 
conflicts they stirred. Their images have given way to new ones 
that reveal much about what we have become in the intervening 
years, and how our national ethos has expanded, in no small part 
to the bounds broken by reformist historians, in ways the white 
“Founding Fathers” might find ironic, though nonetheless 
pleasing.  
 
In the wake of our Vietnam experience, whether tragic or noble, 
our national ethos now allows us now to fully engage a communist 
country our President has admiringly called a “young tiger.”  And 
so in November 2006, in a supreme irony of the present, a 
President engaged on his own mission for democracy can stand 
smiling beneath the statue of Ho Chi Minh in an economically 
vibrant, communist country which we recently engaged in a free 
trade agreement.  And similarly, in this same month, in the 
continuing national struggle to accept all peoples as equal and 
to honor their disparate voices__ even the echoes of a blind, 
Hispanic singer 38 years ago__ perhaps we now can better 
understand the emotion of Andrew Young sobbing on the shoulder of 
Jesse Jackson at the dedication of the new Martin Luther King 
Memorial on the national mall.  
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Perhaps then, as historians, we are that point when the multiple 
and disparate symbols that mark the underlying ethos of our own 
age can be synthesized into a broader meta-narrative that 
captures and reformulates our national ethos in ways made far 
richer and fuller by the deconstructionist histories of the last 
thirty years. The challenge becomes how to arrive at a new 
consensus without creating a new consensus school.  How to find 
solid ground again when the post modernists have created a 
prevailing relativism?  It is not a dilemma dissimilar to one 
confronted by the  Metaphysical Club of Boston in the 1870’s in 
addressing the prevailing “agnosticism” of its day.33  Perhaps 
then, current historians might do well to ponder the approach 
taken by the intellectual forefather of pragmatism and one of the 
Club’s founders.   
 
Charles S. Peirce was at his core an empiricist and tolerated no 
views that were not grounded on some hard empirical research. But 
he also was tolerant of divergent views that emerged from similar 
empirical observation.  And in taking the next step to discern 
some broader truth from “higglety pigglety” of reality, Peirce 
noted the need for “solidarity among competing views.”  In 
Peirce’s construct, truth derives from the “opinion which is 
fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate.”34 This 
is no mean task for American historians, since their 
interpretations of America in the past are inextricably bound up 
in their views of America at present. But here is where the 
historian must separate from the propagandist, editorialist and 
pundit, in order to get the story out of history rather than 
superimposing an ideology (i.e., The Lost Cause) on our past.  
 
                                            
33 Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Company, 2001) p. 201-210.  
34 Novick, pp.570-72. 
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Moreover, if at this particular juncture our history is only 
further deconstructed by ever more finite analyses of minute 
“aspects” of the past, it will becomes more and more like a 
sophisticated ethnographic chronicle than a historical narrative.     
This would indeed be unfortunate since, as Hayden White suggests 
in The Content of Form: 
Historical discourse is a privileged instantiation of the 
human capacity to endow the experience of time with 
meaning, because the immediate referent of this discourse 
is real, rather than imaginary events.35 
 
White positions historical narrative at the pinnacle of the 
hierarchy of story telling. Telling the story of the past is not 
a passive chronicling, nor a scientific endeavor. Rather it 
possesses a unique space that should be larger not smaller. It is 
as White concludes the ability to simultaneously experience time 
in the past, present and future tense.  
 
Surely, a new meta-narrative of our national history that 
credibly unifies the dissonant chords of post modernist 
interpretation will emerge, just as surely as the consensus 
school followed the progressives. Ideally it will be one that 
does not leave us in the rich rubble of post modernism or unable 
to explain the ironies of the past. Nor will it be one that 
superimposes interpretation over the solidity of the evidence. 
Rather it will be a historical narrative that sees in the images 
of Feliciano and Young, Nguyen and Bush a wonderful symmetry in 
the space of our recent history, and reflective of unifying 
themes that come to us as myth and symbol that need to be 
debunked or explained. 
 
35 White p.173.  
